Petroleum Authority of Thailand

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Case Document

PTT: After the Tom-Yum-Kung Disease

An evaluation of the November 2001 initial public offering and

privatization process of the Petroleum Authority of Thailand

The time was 4:15 p.m. in Bangkok when Jarumpron Chotikasathira, an executive vice president of Siam Commercial Bank, stepped closer to the window to look at his watch. The afternoon light was quickly fading as a summer storm brewing over the Gulf of Thailand was fast approaching the city. The impending clouds only deepened Chotikasathira’s suspicion that a very late night stretched out in front of both him and his staff. It was November 15, 2001 and the following day, Siam Commercial, along with four other Thai banks, were leading an initial public offering to privatize the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT), the country’s only fully integrated oil and gas company.
It was estimated that at the five banks’ combined 2,600 nation-wide branches, investors would line up to submit application forms to subscribe to PTT shares. The pre-marketing for the IPO, lead by Credit Suisse First Boston, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and SCB Securities, generated positive feedback and word in financial circles was that PTT’s IPO had potential to be the largest ever in Thailand. Nonetheless, Chotikasathira was worried as a lot was riding on this IPO. A successful deal was critical for the fortunes of the Stock Exchange of Thailand and the Thai government, whose previous privatization programs were abysmal failures. But Chotikasathira’s train of thought was soon interrupted by his assistant who informed him that the thunderstorm had just knocked out power to 700 of the 10,000 computer terminals need to process the subscription forms for the following day’s IPO. Any additional time Chotikasathira would spend worrying about the overall success of PTT’s IPO would have to wait until the computer terminals were back up and running.
Country Background
Thailand means "land of the free," and throughout its 800-year history, Thailand can boast the distinction of being the only country in Southeast Asia never to have been colonized. The first true Thai kingdom was Sukhothai, established in 1238 amidst waning Khmer dominance of the region. During this early period of Thai history, religion prospered, culture flourished and King Ramkhamhaeng developed the first Thai script. For nearly 700 years, Thailand was under an absolute monarchy, however this came to an end in 1932 in a bloodless coup, and a constitutional monarchy similar to that of Britain was soon established.
Until 1939, Thailand's official name was Siam, but that year the country's name was changed to Thailand. Postwar military coups and suppression of democracy activists, notably in 1973, 1976 and 1991, gave way to democratic reform including a new constitution, creating a country where political and press freedoms are some of the strongest in Asia.
Thailand experienced strong economic growth and expansion throughout the late 1980s and much of the1990s. However, in July 1997, Thailand found itself in the midst of one of the worst geographical economic crises. The region’s problems began in Thailand, where there were numerous signs of an impending crisis long before July 1997. Macroeconomic indicators pointed to substantial imbalances: the real exchange rate had appreciated substantially; exports growth had slowed markedly; the current account deficit was persistently large and was increasingly financed by short-term inflows; and external debt was rising quickly. These problems, in turn, exposed other weaknesses in the Thai economy, including substantial, unhedged foreign borrowing by the private sector, an inflated property market, and a weak and over-exposed banking system. The financial sector suffered from high levels of non-performing loans, corporate bankruptcies increased, and construction came to a standstill. The markets also warned of the unsustainability of Thailand’s policies, as seen in lower equity prices and mounting exchange rate pressure.
The signs of emerging macroeconomic problems in Thailand, including a loss of external competitiveness, had been apparent for some time prior to the Asian financial crisis. These problems, in turn, exposed underlying weaknesses in the domestic economy. In early July 1997, the Thai government floated its currency, the Baht, which resulted in an immediate decline in its value. Between July 1997 and February 1998, the Thai Baht lost more than 50 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar, ultimately hitting a record low of Bt 56.45/U.S. dollar on January 12, 1998. The depreciation of the Thai Baht helped push the Thai economy into a severe recession. In the absence of sufficient policy measures, the Asian financial crisis broke and spread to other countries in the region and, ultimately, to financial markets elsewhere around the globe. For additional information on human, economic and trade indicators in Thailand see exhibits 1, 2, and 3 respectively.

The International Monetary Fund

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was in continuous dialogue with the Thai authorities for 18 months prior to the floating of the Baht in July 1997. However, after so many years of outstanding macroeconomic performance, it was difficult, if not impossible, for the authorities in Thailand—and other countries—to recognize that serious underlying deficiencies poised a threat to their impressive track record. What occurred was an unprecedented "denial syndrome," which very quickly spread and which contributed to the delay in taking convincing policy action until, at last, the crisis broke.

Following the fall in the Baht, the Thai government looked abroad for financial assistance and enacted reforms to prevent a similar situation in the future. In August 1997, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) granted Thailand a $17.2 billion package designed to help the country institute economic reforms and get the economy back on track. By mid-July 1998, US$1.08 billion in loans were approved to assist Thailand’s financial sector reform, strengthen economic reform, help with privatization and public enterprise reform, resolve unviable finance companies, reform public administration, increase competitiveness, and improve legal regulations for business.1
With the support of the IMF, Thailand launched a comprehensive program that addressed market concerns about large external deficits and troubled financial institutions. As a result, a comprehensive restructuring of the financial sector was implemented. As a condition for this help, and under orders from the IMF, Thailand’s Chuan Leekpai government agreed to the sale of some of Thailand's most important public assets, including the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT), PTT Exploration and Production, and Bangchak Petroleum. These actions included third party access to natural gas transmission lines, as well as partial or whole privatizations.

Petroleum and Petrochemical Industry Background

Thailand contains nearly 300 million barrels of proven oil reserves. By 1997, Thailand was producing approximately 107,000 bbl/d of oil, of which 71,000 bbl/d was crude. The country's crude production was on the rise since 1995, and has increased 10,000 bbl/d per year. Approximately 70 percent of Thailand's total petroleum demand is imported and more than 70 percent its crude oil imports come from the Persian Gulf.2

The petroleum and petrochemical industry in Thailand is organized into four distinct industrial segments:

  • On-shore and offshore exploration and production;

  • Transmission, processing and distribution of natural gas and crude oil;

  • Production of refined petroleum and petrochemical products; and

  • Distribution, marketing and trading of refined petroleum products.

Historically, the Thai government regulated the petroleum industry through volume, distribution, and pricing controls, which were administered by central government ministries including the NEPC3, NEPO4, the MOI5 and the MOF6. By the 1990s, the Thai government began regulating domestic wholesale prices and gas sale price (which includes marketing margins and transmissions tariffs) to private power producers.

From 1996 to 2000, natural gas consumption increased at a compound annual growth rate of 14.4 percent, from 228 KBoe/d in 1996 to 3090 KBoe/d in 2000. During the same period, crude oil in Thailand decreased at a compound annual rate of 4.1 percent (Exhibit 4).

The primary reasons for the increase in natural gas use consist of:

  • Increased demand from power producers in response to higher demand for electricity in Thailand and a switch to natural gas from alternative fuel sources;

  • Higher crude oil prices; and

  • New emissions standards that required industrial users to switch to cleaner fuel sources for electrical generation. (Exhibit 5)

Natural Gas Industry

Natural gas is transported through an extensive pipeline system (owned primarily by PTT) from the natural gas-producing fields in the Gulf of Thailand and from the Thailand-Myanmar border to gas separation plants or various end users. As of June 30, 2001, the total length of the offshore gas transmission network was 2,390 kilometers. (Exhibit 6 & 7)

Gas separation plants extract natural gas products, such as LPG (liquid petroleum gas), ethane, butane and propane for sale to various customers. LPG is the generic name for commercial propane and commercial butane. It is used primarily as a cooking fuel, while ethane and propane are used as petrochemical feedstock. There are currently five gas separation plants in Thailand (four belong to PTT), and PTT plans to build a sixth gas separation plant in the Mab Ta Phut, Rayong province.
Natural gas is delivered either directly or through a distribution system. Large volume customers, such as power plants, receive gas directly from the transmission networks. Smaller customers receive gas through a pipeline distribution system, which is linked to the gas transmission network.

Oil Industry

In 2000, more than 90 percent of crude oil demand in Thailand was supplied by imports. By 2001, Thailand’s seven refineries were the principal processors of imported and domestic crude oil. The refiners are located in the central regions of Thailand where market demand for refined products is stronger relative to rural regions, thus minimizing distribution costs which are determined largely by proximity to refining facilities to the consuming market.

The primary refined products include gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, fuel oil, kerosene, and LPG. Retailing of refined petroleum products is open to domestic and foreign companies. As of December 31, 2000, PTT had the largest number of service stations in Thailand. (Exhibit 8)

Exploration and Production

The Thai government owns all of nation’s petroleum resources as well as the grant rights that companies need to conduct exploration and production activities in both inshore and offshore properties. Thailand’s petroleum reserves are dominated by natural gas, approximately 90 percent of which are located in the Gulf of Thailand. (Exhibit 9) In addition to PTTEP, a subsidiary of PTT, a number of foreign-owned companies explore, develop, and produce oil and gas properties in Thailand, including Unocal, Chevron, Esso and Thai Shell. (Exhibit 10)

Petrochemical Industry

Thailand has been one of the world’s most rapidly growing producers of petrochemicals in the last ten years. Thailand, a primary exporter of both ethylene and propylene produces more than 1,500 kinds of petrochemical products, which are widely used in different industries. This industry has become more competitive as chief downstream players are integrating with upstream counterparts. (Exhibit 11)

The Petroleum Authority of Thailand
The Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT), Thailand’s only fully integrated oil and gas company, was formed by the 1978 merger of two state-owned behemoths, the Oil and Fuel Organization and the Natural Gas Organization. Since PTT’s inception, it has been the industry leader in both the marketing and distribution of gas, oil and petrochemical products, and is a dominant player in the exploration of these resources. PTT was incorporated on October 1, 2001 as a result of the Corporatization Act enacted by its predecessor. Prior to its incorporation, PTT was a state enterprise focused on developing and promoting Thailand’s petroleum industry and ensuring the security of energy supply to Thailand.
Over the years, PTT has demonstrated strong combined sales revenues. The following table highlights sales revenues from 1999, 2000 and 2001:

Year Ended December 31,

Six Months Ended June 30,

(in millions)













Combined Sales Revenue







Source: PTT Public Company Ltd. Preliminary Offering Circular

PTT Business Model

PTT maintains a leading position in the marketing and distribution of various crude oil, condensate, petrochemical and refined petroleum products in Thailand. PTT’s primary businesses include (Exhibit 12):

  • Procurement, transmission, processing, marketing and distribution of natural gas and gas products; and

  • Exploration, development and production of natural gas, condensate and crude oil through PTT subsidiary PTTEP.

Additionally, PTT maintains strong control over both its upstream and downstream channels. (Exhibit 13)

PTT’s Natural Gas and Oil Businesses

Natural gas is the core focus of the PTT business, and PTT is the principal processor and distributor of natural gas in Thailand. Total operating revenues from PTT’s gas transmission, processing and marketing business segment increased 53.6 percent to Baht 65,026 Baht (US$293 M) compared to the six months ended June 30, 2000. PTT purchases natural gas from PTTEP, its subsidiary, and other producers in Thailand and Myanmar for delivery to customers through its integrated pipeline transmission and distribution system of more than 2,652 kilometers with a capacity of 3170 MMcf/d. For the six months ended June 30, 2001, approximately 78.3 percent of PTT’s natural gas by volume was sold to EGAT, Thailand’s largest power producer, and to other private power producers.

PTT purchases natural gas from producers in Thailand and Myanmar under gas purchase agreements based on take-or-pay provisions which require PTT to pay for minimum quantities of natural gas each year whether or not it actually takes delivery of that minimum quantity during that year. The aggregate contracted minimum quantities PTT’s customers are required to purchase under PTT’s natural gas sales agreements are less than the aggregate contracted annual minimum quantities that they are required to purchase under the take-or-pay provisions. As a result of this arrangement, PTT is vulnerable to paying producers and to finance the related carrying costs for natural gas even if it is unable to take delivery of and resell such gas to their customers. This has had an adverse affect on PTT because the company had to make significant payments to gas producers in Myanmar ($ 660MM) for gas it could not off-take from 1999 –2001. Although this had a serious impact on PTT historically, the growth in natural gas demand due to additional power plants should mitigate much of the prior risk. Furthermore, the payments that were made for natural gas that was not used is now a prepaid expense for additional natural gas supplied from the producers. (Exhibit 14)
PTT’s oil business unit purchases crude oil and condensate from producers within and outside of Thailand. PTT retail mainly engages in the distribution of its oil products through its 1,519 nationwide service stations and operation of storage and distribution facilities.

PTT Exploration & Production

Exploration and production of natural gas is conducted by PTT Exploration & Production (PTTEP), a subsidiary of PTT. As of October 2001, PTT held a 61 % equity interest in PTTEP. Prior to the PPT’s IPO, PTTEP owned approximately 22 percent of proven natural gas reserves in Thailand. As of December 31, 2000, PTTEP’s net proved petroleum reserves were 779 MMboe of which approximately 88.5 percent was natural gas. PTTEP has working interests in thirteen projects, nine of which have proved reserves and are in production. The other five projects are under exploration. Three of PTTEP’s projects are located in Thailand and the remainder is located offshore, in the Gulf of Thailand and the Gulf of Moattama and the Andaman Sea between Thailand and Myanmar. (Exhibit 15)


EGAT, Thailand’s principal power producer, served as PTT’s largest customer prior to privatization. PTT’s sale of natural gas to EGAT represented approximately 12.4 percent and 14.7 percent of PTT’s total revenues in 2000 and the first six months of 2001, respectively. Additionally, approximately 56.3 % and 48.3 % of PTT’s total volume of gas was sold to EGAT during the same timeframe.

PTT is highly dependent on sales to EGAT to generate sufficient cash flows to make payments to their suppliers. Any significant reduction in natural gas sales to EGAT for example, due to a reduction in demand for electricity or financial difficulties at EGAT could have a negative impact on PTT’s business and financial condition. In 1998, the Government announced plans to privatize EGAT in several separate stages. Privatization may adversely affect EGAT’s demand for natural gas.
Although recent growth in demand for natural gas products has not been highly correlated with GDP growth, the demand for energy is generally correlated with GDP. Therefore, any decrease in Thailand’s GDP could lead to a reduction in the demand for energy which would then have a material adverse effect on PTT’s financial conditions and operational results.

Government Regulation

The Government of Thailand through the National Energy Policy Committee (NEPC) and National Energy Policy Organization (NEPO) has regulated gas prices and tariffs charged to EGAT, Independent Power Providers (IPP) and smaller power providers (SPP) since 1996. The gas price is comprised of two components:

  • Gas charge: Based on the gas purchase price plus a marketing margin. The purchase price is the average heating value cost of gas derived from one of the three regional gas pools. Marketing margin varies by customer and is capped. The marketing margin is designed to compensate PTT for supply and marketing costs.

  • Transmission tariff: This allow PTT to receive an agreed internal rate of return on equity to cover its financing, operating, and maintenance costs. The tariff consists of a demand and commodity charge. The demand charge reflects invested costs and fixed operating expenses of a pipeline system, and is based on the quantity of contracted gas volumes. The commodity charge reflects variable expenses and is based on the actual quantity of gas delivered.

From time to time, the Government has requested that PTT provide it with information regarding the impact of lowering the marketing margin and transmission tariff on PTT’s business and financial condition, and could lower either or both. The Thai Government has also historically intervened with prices to control inflation and/or achieve other social and economic objectives. Although the Government has stated its intention not to change prices in the future, it has the ultimate discretion to regulate the prices at which PTT may sell their gas and oil products.

Energy Industry Act
To facilitate continued reform, the Energy Industry Act is under draft and is expected to become law in 2002. The act is expected to form a new independent regulatory body, the National Energy Regulatory Commission (NERC), to regulate both the electricity and natural gas supply industries and to ensure fair competition. This agency’s key responsibilities will include:

  • Primarily regulating the electricity supply industry (ESI) and the gas supply industry (GSI);

  • Regulating tariffs, standards and service quality;

  • Ensuring competition and preventing abuse of monopoly power;

  • Protecting consumers and dealing with consumer complaints; and

  • Considering and proposing pipeline network expansion plans to NEPC.

With the passing of the Energy Industry Act, PTT’s current marketing margins and transmissions tariffs will be reviewed and, possibly, changed. Such changes would definitely impact PTT’s profitability.

In addition to the formulation of a new regulatory body, the Energy Industry Act will open the doors to new domestic and foreign competition in PTT’s different business segments. In the gas transmission, marketing and processing segment, the expected creation of the Third Party Access (TPA) Code, PTT will face increased competition, which it has not experienced in the past. PTT can expect to face more competition from corporations that have experience in the gas marketing business. Furthermore, new contracts directly between suppliers and end users may exclude PTT from the supply and marketing aspect of such transactions, which will also impact PTT’s dominant position.

PTT’s Privatization

Following the Asian crisis and with encouragement from the IMF, the Thai government stepped up its efforts to privatize state-run Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) placing the plans for privatization on the "fast track." The government considered two methods for the privatization of PTT. The first would transform PTT into a holding company and list it on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). This would enable investors to invest in all of PTT businesses and subsidiaries. Over time, the holding company would gradually sell off its holdings in the subsidiaries. In the second method, PTT would separate its subsidiaries and allow them to independently seek listings on the SET. Under this method, investors would have the opportunity to invest in only those businesses that they saw as profitable. The government hoped to raise up to $14 billion in the first three years through the privatization process. The money would be crucial in helping ease budgetary pressures as the country tried to rebound from its economic situation. The plan was to have a privatization plan in place by the fourth quarter of 1998, but was later scheduled for 2001.

PTT’s launch of the deal in November 2001 actually occurred some five years after the company first began to ready itself for market. PTT’s IPO launch was a long-awaited signal of the government's intention to actively bolster the stock exchange rather than just talk about doing it. For PTT, which ranked in the Fortune 500 list of global companies at the beginning of the 1990's, the transaction also marked an acceptance of economic reality and an opportunity to start cutting government apron strings. The deal was structured as a primary share offering allowing PTT to use proceeds to pay down debt largely incurred in the post Asian crisis bailout of government-owned subsidiaries such as Thai Oil and Bangchak Petroleum. "The whole point of this privatization is not to raise money for the government, but to free PTT and force it to make its own investment decisions," says one Thai specialist. "Secondary to this, the government has privatization commitments to meet with the IMF and World Bank."7
PTT Strengths
There are many reasons that make PTT’s IPO attractive to the outside investor. The continued growth in the gas industry in Thailand as an alternative to oil products has spurred very strong financial results for PTT. For the six months ended June 30,2001, PTT’s total revenues increased 19.9 percent to 190,724 million Baht($4,214M) and their net income increased 21.3% to 13,279 Baht ($293 million) compared to the six months ended June 30,2000. EBITDA also increased 21.3 percent to 25,455 million Baht ($562 million) for the six months ended June 30, 2001 compared to the six months ended June 30, 2000. In addition to their strong financial results, PTT benefits from the following strengths:

  • Dominant position in an established and growing natural gas market. Natural gas consumption has grown at a compound annual growth rate of 14.4 percent from 1996 through 2000 despite the financial Asian crisis. As the sole owner and operator of Thailand’s natural gas transmission pipeline network, PTT has a dominant position in this growing market.

  • Integrated natural gas operations. PTT’s pipeline networks link their upstream business through PTTEP, their gas separations plants, and, finally, PTT’s downstream marketing operations.

  • Gas earnings reduce exposure to oil price volatility. A substantial portion of earnings is derived from gas transmissions tariffs (see Regulation section), which are not affected to natural gas and oil prices.

  • Low cost and growing upstream operations. PTTEP has an established track record for growing its low cost production.

  • Leading position in petroleum products. PTT operates the largest marketing and distribution system for refined oil products in Thailand. Their net margins are further enhanced by contracts with large volume customers, which also lowers cost due to lower infrastructure costs.

  • Experienced management team. PTT’s management has demonstrated proven success in maintaining operating profits even during the Asian financial crisis. Most of PTT’s key senior management has public-company management experience through involvement with PTTEP.

Financial Structure

PTT is highly leveraged. As of June 30,2001, PTT’s total long-term debt was Baht 152,424 MM ($3,368 million) and their debt to equity value was approximately 79.8 % (Exhibit 16-18). Due to their high levels of debt, PTT’s exposure to adverse general economic conditions, such as the financial Asian crisis, are heightened. A concern for PTT is their exposure to fluctuations in the exchange rate with the Baht against the dollar because a portion of their debt obligations are denominated in dollars while most of their revenues are denominated in Baht and only partially linked t the dollar. With the additional infusion in cash generated from their IPO, PTT plans to make significant debt payments to lower their current capital structure. PTT’s financial projects are based on their expectation of continued growth in the natural gas industry that they have experienced up to their IPO.

Jarumpron Chotikasathira returned to his office after spending several frenetic hours ensuring the 700 computer were functioning after the summer storm that rolled in. The IPO was set to happen in nearly twelve hours, and Chotikasathira wondered if the Thai Government and other involved stakeholders were making the right decision. At this point it was not a question of whether or not the IPO would occur, it was going to happen, but the question in Chotikasathira’s mind was whether the IPO was the right move for PTT and the country of Thailand. Would it be a success?

Exhibit 1: Thailand Data Profile – Human Indicators

Human Indicators




Population, total (in millions)




Population growth (annual %)




Life expectancy at birth (years)




Fertility rate, total (births per woman)




Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)




Urban Population (% of total)




Illiteracy rate, adult male (% of males 15+)




Illiteracy rate, adult female (% of females 15+)




Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2002

Exhibit 2: Thailand Data Profile – Economic Indicators

Economic Indicators




GDP (current $, in billions)




GDP growth (annual %)




Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)




Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)




Industry, value added (% of GDP)




Services, value added (% of GDP)




Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)




Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)




Current revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP)




Overall budget balance, including grants

(% of GDP)




Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2002

Exhibit 3: Thailand Data Profile – Trade Indicators

Trade Indicators




Trade in goods as a share of GDP (%)




Trade in goods as a share of goods GDP (%)




Foreign direct investment, net flows in reporting country (current US$ in billions)




Present value of debt (current US$ in billions)




Total debt service

(% of exports of goods and services)




Short-term debt outstanding

(current US$ in billions)




Aid per capita (current US$)




Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2002

Exhibit 4: Thailand’s Total Commercial Energy Consumption

Total Commercial

Percentage of Total Commercial Energy Consumption


Energy Consumption



Crude Oil

Natural Gas

Hydro Electric































Source: NEPO Journal, Volume 51, January – March 2001

Exhibit 5: Sources for Electricity Generation in Thailand



Natural Gas

Fuel Oil


(in GwH)



Imported Electricity and SPP



















46, 238






















Six months ended

June 30, 2001








Source: NEPO

Exhibit 6: PTT Pipeline Network

Exhibit 7: PTT Natural Gas Supply

Exhibit 8: Number of Service Stations in Thailand as of December 31, 2000

Source: Thailand Ministry of Commerce

Exhibit 9: Thailand’s Petroleum Reserve Balances
Source: DMR Annual Report 1998 -2000

Exhibit 10: Top Producing Operators in Thailand

Source: DMR Annual Report 2000

Exhibit 11: Thailand’s Ethylene Production, Import, Export and Domestic Consumption

Source: DMR Annual Report 2000

Exhibit 12: PTT Organization Structure

Exhibit 13: PTT Value Chain

Exhibit 14:Actual vs. Contracted Myanmar Gas

Exhibit 15: PTTEP’s Active Projects

Proposed 2001
Drilling Program




Partners Working Interest (%)

PTTEP’s Working Interest (%)

Number of Production Wells

Appraisal& Exploration Wells

Development Wells

In Production


Southern Gulf of Thailand


Total Thai, BG





Unocal III

Southern Gulf of Thailand

Unocal Thai

Unocal Thai MOECO






North-Central Thailand

Thai Shell

Thai Shell






Central Thailand








Northeast Thailand








Gulf of Moattama (Myanmar)

Total Mayunmar

Total Myanmar, Unocal Myanmare, MOGE






Gulf of Moattama


Premier, Petronas, Nippon Oil, MOGE






Southern Gulf of Thailand

Unocal Thai

Unocal Thai, Amerada Hess, MOECO





Under Exploration

JDA (B17, C19)

Northern Mala Basin








Southern Gulf of Thailand


Unocal Thai, MOECO





Block B & 48/95


Unocal Vietnam

Unocal Vietnam, MOECO Vietnam, Petro Vietnam





B 52/97


Unocal SW






W 7/38

Andaman Sea

Kerr McGee

Kerr McGee





Source: PTTEP

Exhibit 16: PTT Consolidated Balance Sheet

Exhibit 17: PTT Consolidated Income Statement

Exhibit 18: PTT Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows

1 Information gathered from IMF website.

2 From U.S. Energy Information Administration Working Document, April 1998.

3 NEPC, National Energy Regulatory Commission, is the government agency primarily responsible for establishing and overseeing energy policy in Thailand. NEPC resolutions are the definitive statement of the Government on energy policy.

4 NEPO, National Energy Policy Organization, is the secretary office of the NEPC and responsible for studying and analyzing energy policies as well as implanting NEPC resolutions.

5 MOI is responsible for regulating the petroleum industry in Thailand. Exploration and production of petroleum is based on concessions granted by the industry Minister and approved by the Cabinet.

6 The MOF has the responsibility to monitor the financial condition and maintain the financial integrity of state enterprises.

7 PTT Begins Pre-Marketing, Jackie Horne, Oct. 16, 2001,


Jay Bhutani and Oleg Lebedev, June 2002, PTT: High-Quality Assets and Double Digit Earnings Growth, Lehman Brothers Global Equity Research

PTT Public Company, Analyst Briefing, June 2002
PTT Public Company Ltd. Preliminary Offering Circular, April 2002
Supavud Saicheua, March 2002, Thailand Strategy, Merrill Lynch Equity Research
Wanikpun, Traviati, and Adrian Loh, June 2002, PTT Public Company Limited; Compelling Valuation With Improving Outlook, Merrill Lynch Equity Research

Website References
EIU website (country reports)
Financial Times website
International Monetary Fund website

World Bank Website

The situations described in this document are intended to serve the learning objectives of this case, and are not necessarily intended to be a representation of fact.

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